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Abstract
We investigate how the intensity of competition among airports affects their technical
efficiency by computing airports’ markets on the basis of a potential demand approach.
We find that the intensity of competition has a negative impact on airports’ efficiency
in Italy during the 2005–2008 period. This implies that airports belonging to a local
air transportation system where competition is strong exploit their inputs less intensively
than do airports with local monopoly power. Furthermore, we find that public airports
are more efficient than private and mixed ones. Since public airports take into account
the positive externalities created by air transportation in the local economy, they are
more willing to subsidize airlines in developing the airports’ connections. Hence, policy
makers should provide incentives to implement airports’ specialization in local systems
where competition is strong. Moreover, when regulating airport charges, they should take
into account the impact of the above externalities.
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1 Introduction
An important effect of the liberalization process implemented in the EU
air transportation market has been the exponential growth in the European
network. Today every European airline can provide new European connections
(i.e., flights having origin and destination in airports belonging to the EU
25) without any further restrictions than that regarding slot availability.2 As
a consequence, if we consider all 460 airports of the 18 countries belonging
to the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) in 1997 (i.e., the 15 EU
members plus Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland), the total number of airport
pairs connections has signed an impressive 35% increase, from 3,410 in 1997
to 4,612 in 2008, with a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) equal to
2.78%.3 Furthermore, the total number of connecting flights has increased
from 4,102,484 in 1997 to 5,228,688 in 2008, with a CAGR for the period
equal to 2.23%.
The network expansion has increased the intensity of competition between
airports, given that travelers may now choose the same origin–destination
route using alternative flights. The latter may be available at the same
airport (the competition is within the airport) or at different nearby ones
(the competition is between airports). Our aim is to investigate the impact of
competition on airports’ technical efficiency, which is an important factor in
air transportation: airport efficiency is linked both with airport charges and
with the services provided to airlines and passengers (e.g., shorter aircraft
2The EU liberalization process started in 1987 and, through the sequential implemen-
tation of several packages, has now formed a uniquely large internal market. The set
of measures adopted in December 1987 led to the approval of the “first package” of the
integrated European rules on air transportation. Two other packages (1990 and 1992) led
up to the creation of the European common market. However, the complete liberalization
entered into force in April 1997, 15 years after the start of the process.
3Data where extracted from the Official Airline Guide (OAG) database; information
regarding the total number of operating flights connecting airports belonging to the
European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) during a year. Operating flights means that
co–sharing connections are considered as a single flight, to avoid useless replications.
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turnaround times, quicker passenger transfer, faster baggage claim times,
etc.). Hence, we want to analyze whether airports with a higher intensity of
competition are more technically efficient.
A further interesting feature of airport competition in Europe is the
presence of different ownership types. The large majority of European airports
are controlled either by local governments (e.g., municipalities, regional
governments, etc.) or by private agents. Furthermore, some airports have a
mixed ownership (local governments and private agents).4 Hence, we want
also to test whether a specific ownership type leads to greater efficiency. This
paper deals with these issues by developing a potential demand approach to
compute an airport competition index and a multi–output stochastic frontier
econometric model to estimate technical efficiency. These techniques are
applied to a sample of 38 Italian airports for the period 2005–2008.
We find a statistically significant negative relation between airport com-
petition and technical efficiency. This implies that an airport that is closer
to the local monopoly model has an efficient utilization of its inputs and
assets. In contrast, an airport with strong competition has a lower technical
efficiency because it may lose passengers and flights (which move toward
nearby facilities), while keeping the same assets.5 This implies a reduction
in its technical efficiency. In order to recover it, this airport has either to
stimulate new demand (e.g., by attracting new Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) or
offering new point–to–point connections not provided at nearby airports) or
to divert the existing demand from other airports. However, these goals may
be difficult to achieve, because of both the presence of strong airline buying
power and some relevant switching costs.6
4Spain is a relevant exception since all Spanish airports are controlled by the same
central government authority, AENA.
5Many airports cannot be easily modified. For instance, the estimated utilization period
of a runway is about 50 years.
6In many small and medium Italian regional airports, the main LCCs have strong
buyer power, because they account for a large share of the airport’s traffic. Under these
circumstances, airports frequently subsidize LCCs for the flights provided (the so called
co–marketing strategy). The subsidy is usually equal to a fixed rebate per passenger.
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Second, we find that public airports are the most efficient ones, while
private facilities are even less efficient than mixed airports. A possible
explanation is that public airports take into account the positive externalities
produced by air transportation in the local economy. In contrast, private
airports only maximize their profit and have tighter budget constraints. Hence,
they may be more willing to subsidize airlines, sometimes incurring losses
that are then covered by local taxation.7 This implies that public airports
have more attractive power with regard to airlines.
The above results yield the following policy implications: first, airports’
specialization within the same local system (for instance, one airport may
focus on LCCs and another on cargo) may be a policy recommendation to
recover efficiency without requiring long–run investments in the accessibility
system. Another extreme possibility is closing down some airports with very
high inefficiency levels.8 Second, airport charges should be regulated taking
fully into consideration the positive externalities created in the surrounding
territory, even when applied to private airports. These settings should boost
private investments in airport infrastructure, including accessibility systems.
To the best of our knowledge, few previous contributions have attempted
to model airport competition. Malighetti et al. [2007] estimate an airport’s
potential demand by adopting a fixed radius technique, whereby an airport’s
competitors are all the other airports located within a fixed distance around
the airport. Oum et al. [2008] assume that airports are in competition if
they belong to the same metropolitan area. These arbitrary approaches may
Furthermore, switching costs may be caused by different accessibility systems among
airports and by the presence of relevant transaction costs when signing up a contract with
a new handler.
7This has created hot discussion within the sector since this practice may be considered
as state aid, which is forbidden in the EU (see the well known Charleroi–Ryanair case (EU
[2004])).
8For instance, we find that Parma airport, a small regional facility, is constantly at
about 60% distance from the estimated production frontier; furthermore, the 2008 annual
report of the company managing the airport presents a loss of 4.2 million Euros. The loss
was even larger in 2007.
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overstate the true size of some markets and understate others, especially in
Europe, where urbanization is different than in the U.S. (many towns and
airports are relatively close). Furthermore, they do not take into account
the determinants of the demand for airport services in a geographic area.
Our model instead considers travelers’ costs as exogenous factors affecting
demand and builds an airport geographic market (i.e., its Catchment Area,
CA) based on this variable.
Many papers have instead investigated airports’ technical efficiency, but
they do not consider the impact of airport competition on it. The majority
has adopted a non parametric approach (i.e., Data Envelopment Analysis—
DEA).9 The latter presents some drawbacks. First, it does not take into
account the impact of random shocks on production (e.g., weather conditions,
epidemic diseases, volcanic eruptions, etc.). Second, as shown by Simar and
Wilson [2007], this approach leads to biased estimates of the effects of some
exogenous variables on the inefficiency scores.10
We compute airport efficiency using instead a parametric approach; in
doing so, we have links with a limited number of previous contributions.
Pels et al. [2001, 2003] adopt a stochastic frontier model without taking
into account the multi–output features of airports’ activities (i.e., aircraft,
passenger, and cargo movements); Barros [2008], Oum et al. [2008] and
Mart´ın et al. [2009] estimate a cost stochastic frontier using accounting data,
9See Gillen and Lall’s seminal contribution [1997], and the comprehensive survey
provided by Lozano and Gutie´rrez [2009]. These studies usually deal with a single country
(e.g., the U.S., Brazil, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, Italy, and Spain), but there are also some
studies at a European level and a few that benchmark airports from different countries.
10This analysis is usually performed with a two–stage approach, DEA in the first stage
and a Tobit or truncated regression in the second stage. For instance, Gillen and Lall
[1997] first estimate an output oriented DEA model and then use the estimated inefficiency
scores as a dependent variable in a Tobit regression with yearly and territorial dummies
as explanatory variables. Simar and Wilson [2007] show that the inefficiency scores are
serially correlated since they depend on all input and output observations; consequently
the error terms in the Tobit regression are also serially correlated. Furthermore, the latter
correlation does not disappear quickly enough for standard inference approaches.
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a choice that involves some problems in computing input prices.11 Finally,
Chow and Fung [2009] and Tovar and Mart´ın-Cejas [2009], which adopt
a multi–output approach, did not investigate the determinants of airports’
estimated inefficiency scores.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the multi–output
stochastic distance function adopted to estimate the airports’ technical effi-
ciency and the model of potential demand developed to compute the airport
competition index. The data set is described in Section 3, while empirical
results are reported in Section 4. Concluding comments are highlighted in
Section 5.
2 Methodology
This section is split into two parts: first we introduce the stochastic distance
function econometric model. Second we develop a model of an airport’s
potential demand. This is based on the identification of the population
belonging to the catchment area that has the possibility (measured in terms of
“reasonable” traveling times) to choose between alternative airports. Building
on the estimated potential demand and on the connections available in nearby
airports, we then compute an index of airport competition.
2.1 The stochastic distance function econometric model
In order to analyze the determinants of airports efficiency, a crucial step is
the estimation of a production frontier for an airport system.
We implement a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), by which it is possible
to disentangle random shocks from technical inefficiency, as shown by Aigner,
Lovell, and Schmidt [1977] and Meeusen and van den Broeck [1977] in their
11These contributions have no information on unit labor costs or unit capital costs; they
are obtained from balance sheet data. The latter may lead to biased estimates, since,
for instance, the assets values are not updated (e.g., the historical value of a runway is
registered in the balance sheet and not its substitution value).
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seminal contributions.12 Furthermore, SFA may involve “the incorporation
of exogenous variables, which are neither inputs to the production process
nor outputs of it, but which nonetheless exert an influence on producers’
performance” (Kumbhakar and Lovell [2000], p. 261).
Other important issues need to be addressed when an airport’s efficiency is
investigated. First, our aim is to measure technical efficiency—i.e., an airport
management’s ability to achieve efficient input utilization. This means that we
do not identify the input combination yielding the minimum cost.13 Second,
since airports are typically multi–product firms, an appropriate multi–output
framework for estimating technical efficiency is required. As shown by Coelli
and Perelman [1999, 2000] and Kumbhakar and Lovell [2000], this implies
the estimation of a stochastic distance function. Third, we need to choose
between input and output orientation. The former (the latter) identifies the
inputs’ reduction (the output improvements) required to reach the efficient
frontier. Given that in airport operation many inputs are indivisible (at least
in the short run), an output oriented stochastic distance function seems to be
more appropriate, especially in a context where airports are in competition.14
In this framework we define P (x) as the airports’ production possibility
set—i.e., the output vector y ∈ RM+ that can be obtained using the input
vector x ∈ RK+ . That is: P (x) = {y ∈ RM+ : x can produce y}. By assuming
that P (x) satisfies the axioms listed in Fare et al. [1994], we introduce
Shepard’s [1970] output oriented distance function:
12They were the first to develop SFA, where the error term of the usual regression model
is equal to the sum of two components. The first one is typically assumed to be normally
distributed and represents the usual statistical noise (i.e., the random shocks). The second
component is non negative and represents technical inefficiency.
13This is due to the features of our data set that do not include monetary variables—e.g.,
input prices, airports’ different revenues, etc.—but only physical inputs and outputs.
14Our approach is different from Tovar and Mart´ın-Cejas [2009], who assume that
“demand is beyond the airports’ control and it has to be met”, p. 254. We believe instead
that airports’ managers have the capacity to improve traffic movements, for instance by
attracting new carriers.
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DO(x, y) = min{θ : (y/θ) ∈ P (x)}, (1)
where θ ≤ 1. Lovell et al. [1994] show that the distance function (1)
is nondecreasing, positively linearly homogeneous, and convex in y, and
decreasing in x. DO(x, y) = 1 means that y is located on the outer boundary
of the production possibility set—i.e., DO(x, y) = 1 if y ∈ IsoqP (x) = {y :
y ∈ P (x), ωy 6∈ P (x), ω > 1}. If instead DO(x, y) < 1, y is located below
the frontier; in this case, the distance represents the gap between the observed
output and the maximum feasible output. This gap may be due both to
random shocks and to inefficiency, as will be shown later.
We adopt a translog distance function for its nice properties: (i) it is
flexible, (ii) it is easy to calculate, and (iii) it allows the imposition of
homogeneity.15
If we assume that there areM outputs and K inputs, the translog distance
function is defined as follows:
lnDOit = α0 +
M∑
m=1
αm ln ymit +
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
αmn ln ymit ln ynit
+
K∑
k=1
βk ln xkit +
1
2
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βkl ln xkit ln xlit
+
1
2
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
ζkm ln xkit ln ymit
i = 1, 2, ..., N t = 1, 2, ..., T,
(2)
where N is the total number of airports in the sample and T represents the
total periods (years) of observation. Hence, lnDOit is the distance from the
frontier of airport i in year t. Notice that being on the frontier yields DOit = 1,
so that the left–hand side of Eq. (2) is equal to zero.
15Notice that a Cobb–Douglas distance function requires a constant elasticity of substi-
tution, which is unlikely to be fulfilled.
7
As shown by Coelli and Perelman [2000], the restrictions required for
homogeneity of degree 1 in outputs are the following ones:
M∑
m=1
αm = 1;
M∑
n=1
αmn = 0, m = 1, 2, . . . ,M ;
M∑
m=1
ζkm = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
Furthermore, the restrictions required for symmetry of the interaction terms
are: αmn = αnm (m,n = 1, 2, ...,M), βkl = βlk (k, l = 1, 2, ..., K). The
homogeneity condition upon Eq. (2) implies that DO(x, ωy) = ωDO(x, y).
Hence, it is possible to choose arbitrarily one of the outputs (e.g., output M),
so that we define ω = 1/yM and obtain the following expression:
DO(x, y/yM) = DO(x, y)/yM . (3)
Given Eq. (3), the translog distance function becomes:
ln(DOit/yMit) = α0 +
M−1∑
m=1
αm ln y
∗
mit +
1
2
M−1∑
m=1
M−1∑
n=1
αmn ln y
∗
mit ln y
∗
nit
+
K∑
k=1
βk ln xkit +
1
2
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βkl ln xkit ln xlit
+
1
2
K∑
k=1
M−1∑
m=1
ζkm ln xkit ln y
∗
mit,
(4)
where y∗mit = ymit/yMit. Equation (4) can be written as ln(DOit/yMit) =
TL(xit, yit/yMit, α, β, ζ), where TL stands for the translog function. Hence,
we can write:
−ln(yMit) = TL(xit, yit/yMit, α, β, ζ)− ln(DOit). (5)
In Eq. (5), the term −ln(DOit) is non–observable and can be interpreted
as an error term in the regression model. If we replace it with (vit − uit),
we get the typical SFA composed error term: vit are random variables that
are assumed to be iid as N(0, σ2v) and independent of the uit; the latter are
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non–negative random variables distributed as N(mit, σ
2
u). vit represent the
random shocks, while the inefficiency scores are given by uit. Hence, we can
now write the translog output–oriented stochastic distance function that we
are going to regress later:
−ln(yMit) = α0 +
M−1∑
m=1
αm ln y
∗
mit +
1
2
M−1∑
m=1
M−1∑
n=1
αmn ln y
∗
mit ln y
∗
nit
+
K∑
k=1
βk ln xkit +
1
2
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βkl ln xkit ln xlit
+
1
2
K∑
k=1
M−1∑
m=1
ζkm ln xkit ln y
∗
mit + vit − uit.
(6)
In order to investigate the determinants of inefficiency, we apply a single–
stage estimation procedure following Coelli [1996].16 The technical inefficiency
effect, uit in Eq. (6) can be specified as follows:
uit = δzit + wit, (7)
where the random variable wit is defined by the truncation of the normal
distribution with zero mean and variance, σ2, such that the point of truncation
is -δzit; i.e., wit ≥ −δzit. Furthermore, zit is a p × 1 vector of exogenous
variables that may influence the efficiency of a firm, and δ is a 1× p column
vector of parameters to be estimated. Battese and Coelli [1995] propose a
method of maximum likelihood that is equivalent to the Kumbhakar et al.
[1991] and Reifschneider and Stevenson [1991] specification, but applied to
panel data.17
16This issue was addressed by Kumbhakar et al. [1991] and Reifschneider and Stevenson
[1991] who propose stochastic frontier models in which the inefficiency effects are expressed
as an explicit function of a vector of firm–specific variables and a random error.
17The model proposed by Battese and Coelli [1995] differs from that of Kumbhakar et al.
[1991] and Reifschneider and Stevenson [1991] in that the wit random variables are not
identically distributed, nor are they required to be non–negative. Furthermore, the mean,
δzit, of the normal distribution, which is truncated at zero to obtain the distribution of uit,
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According to this time–varying specification of airports’ inefficiency, the
technical efficiency of airport i at period t is defined as follows:
TEit = e
−uit . (8)
2.2 The airport Competition Index
The common approach to defining markets for airports assumes that an
airport’s relevant geographic market consists roughly of a circular area around
its geographic location. A fixed–radius technique is usually implemented
in order to define the airport’s competitors. The latter are all the other
airports located within a fixed distance around the airport. The fixed–radius
technique presents some drawbacks, however. First, it is arbitrary. Second, it
overstates the true size of some markets and understates others—especially, as
mentioned before, in Europe. Finally, it does not depend on the determinants
of the demand for airport services in a geographic area (Gosling [2003]).
In dealing with these issues, we have to take into account that any measure
based on the determinants of demand cannot be implemented using actual
realized airport choices taken by passengers (or by firms shipping freights).
Observed choices may be influenced by unobservable airport heterogeneity
regarding the quality and the cheapness of their available supply (Kessler
and McClellan [2000]). This, in turn, is likely to produce biased estimates of
demand determinants. For this reason, it is necessary to compute predicted
travelers choices based on exogenous factors. We consider traveling costs as
exogenous factors affecting demand and build an airport geographic market
(i.e., CA) based on this variable. The proxy we adopt is given by passenger
traveling time to reach airports. Hence, we assume that individuals are
potential passengers of any airport that they can reach in a reasonable time.
Our technique is composed of several steps.18 First, we draw a boundary
is not required to be positive for each observation, as in Reifschneider and Stevenson [1991].
The likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters σ2 = σ2v + σ
2
u and
γ = σ2u/(σ
2
v + σ
2
u).
18A similar technique has been implemented by Propper et al. [2004, 2008] for hospitals.
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around airport i that defines all the zip codes within T minutes drive from
that airport. We will consider the following specifications of the maximum
traveling time: T = {60, 75, 90, 105, 120}.19 We compute the traveling time
from zip code j to airport i driving a car on three different road types: urban
roads, extra–urban roads, and motorways.20 All the zip codes falling within
the T–minutes defined boundary are included in the catchment area of airport
i; i.e., CAi.
Second, we define ηi as the set of population living in airport i’s catchment
area. The latter is the population living in all zip code towns belonging to
CAi. Similarly, ηj is the set of population living in airport j’s catchment
area, CAj.
21
Third, since in air transportation each O–D route defines a separate
market, airport i is subject to competition coming from airport j only if the
same route is available at both airports. This means that airport i and airport
j must have either the same airport destination, or a destination in different
airports but located at a reasonable distance. We assume that different flights
have the same destination if the arrival airports are located at a maximum
distance equal to 100 kilometers.22 The application of different methodologies
to estimating the potential demand at the origin and destination airports
is due to the different exogenous factors affecting them. Traveling costs are
19The analyses performed by many airports and national aviation authorities (for instance
the British CAA) show that almost all passengers choosing a given airport leave in an area
where it is possible to reach the airport within 90 minutes.
20The driving times, influenced by the different road types, are computed using
GoogleMaps.
21Hence, we assume that the value of time is the same for the entire population living
a given area. Clearly, people traveling for business may have a different value of time in
comparison to leisure passengers. This means that the maximum traveling distance should
be lower for people with high value of time. We did not consider this issue for simplicity.
Hence the share of population that may choose among alternative airports is greater in our
approach, which means that we overestimate the degree of airport competition. However,
the share of business travelers is small, and so this effect is rather negligible.
22Fuellhart [2003] shows that airports are subject to strategic interaction if they are
located within a circle with 95 kilometer–150 kilometer rays.
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the main determinant of the origin airport’s potential demand, while the
region where the travel is directed is instead the main factor influencing the
destination airport’s potential demand. The intuition is the following: a
traveler, when choosing a flight, considers first the region that needs to be
reached (not necessarily the town but also the surrounding region), then she
or he verifies whether, at a reasonable traveling distance, this region can be
reached leaving from different origin airports.
Hence, if we consider all airports where route r is available, we define the
following expression:
ηij,r = {(ηi ∩ ηj) \ ηk, ∀k 6= i, j}
ηijk,r = {(ηi ∩ ηj ∩ ηk) \ ηh, ∀h 6= i, j, k}
. . . ,
where ηij,r is the subset of population leaving in CAi, which has only the
possibility to reach also airport j within T minutes traveling time for the
route r; ηijk,r is the subset of ηi, which has only the possibility to reach also
airport j and airport k within T minutes traveling time, always for the route
r. Fourth, if we denote ηˆi,r as the potential demand of airport i on the route
r, this is given by:
ηˆi,r = ηi −
∑
j
1
2
ηij,r −
∑
k
1
3
ηijk,r −
∑
h
1
4
ηijkh,r + . . . . (9)
Fifth, the Competition Index for airport i on route r (CIi,r) is:
CIi,r = 1− ηˆi,r
ηi
, 0 ≤ CIi,r ≤ 1. (10)
We need an aggregate index of competition for airport i—i.e., a measure
that takes into account all of the routes available in that airport and also their
relative importance. The latter is given, for route r, by the ratio between
the number of Available Seats for route r in airport i (ASi,r) and the total
number of Available Seats (ASi) in the same airport.
23
23ASi,r and ASi are taken from the OAG database. The available seats is the variable
adopted in air trasportation to measure the flight capacity.
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Hence, the aggregate index of competition for airport i is defined as
follows:
CIi =
R∑
r=1
ASi,r
ASi
× CIi,r, (11)
where 0 ≤ CIi ≤ 1 and R is the total number of routes available in airport i.
This implies that the higher is CIi, the more airport i is subject to competition.
Figure 1 provides an example of the methodology.
Suppose we want to compute CIA by applying Eq. (11). After having
fixed a given level of T , the procedure draws the boundary of its catchment
area, given by the grey area. Suppose that airport B is the unique nearby
airport, and that people living in the dashed area represent the population
that may, within T minutes, also reach airport B.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The next step is to consider the available routes at the two airports.
Airport A has two routes: A–C and A–D. Airport B has only route B–E.
Routes A–D and B–E belong to the same market for the population ηAB
since airport D is located at less than 100 kilometers distance from airport E.
Clearly, on route A–C, airport A is not subject to any competition coming
from airport B. Hence, ηAB,A−C = 0, while ηAB,A−D = ηAB. Consequently,
from Eq. (9) we get that ηˆA,A−C = ηA, while ηˆA,A−D = ηA − 12ηAB. Then,
from Eq. (10) we get: CIA,A−C = 0, while CIA,A−D = 1 − ηA−
1
2
ηAB
ηA
= ηAB
2ηA
.
Now, suppose that ASA,A−D = 50 (i.e., during a year the total number of
available seats for the route A–D is equal to 50) and that ASA = 100. Hence,
from Eq. (11) we obtain CIA = 0 +
50
100
× ηAB
ηA
= ηAB
4ηA
, which is airport A’s
competition index.
3 Data
The multi–output/multi–input production frontier for Italian airports is
estimated using annual data on 38 airports over the period 2005–2008. The
13
data sources are Ente Nazionale Aviazione Civile (ENAC)24 for outputs (i.e.,
aircraft, passenger, and freight movements) and the technical information
provided by the airports’ official documents for inputs. The latter have been
integrated by a direct investigation with the managing boards of the airports.
Information regarding exogenous variables have been collected from the Italian
national institute for statistics (ISTAT) and from the airports’ balance sheets.
The Italian airport system is composed of 101 airports; among them only 45
are open to commercial aviation, while the others are small airports operating
only for general aviation (private aircraft and air taxi). Hence, our data set
covers 84% of Italian airports and 99.97% of passenger movements.25
For each airport we compute two output variables: the yearly number of
aircraft movements (ATM) and of Work Load Units movements (WLU)—i.e.,
a combination of passenger and freight movements.
In air transportation, by convention, passengers and freight are combined in
a single output measure,WLU , such that 100 kilograms of freight corresponds
to one passenger. Regarding inputs, we consider the runway capacity (CAP )
(measured as the maximum number of authorized flights per hour),26 the
total number of aircraft parking positions (PARK), the terminal surface
area (TERM), the number of check–in desks (CHECK), the number of
baggage claims (BAG), and the number of employees not involved in handling
activities, measured in terms of Full–Time Equivalent units (FTE). The
descriptive statistics regarding outputs and inputs are presented in Table 1.27
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
24ENAC is the Italian authority in charge of air transportation regulation.
25In year 2008, the total number of passengers in the 7 missing airports was equal to
about 41 thousand, while the total number of passengers in the whole Italian system was
equal to about 133 million.
26This variable takes into account both the runway length and the airport’s aviation
technology level—e.g., some aviation infrastructure such as ground–control radars and
runway lighting systems.
27Notice that we have not included in our inputs the total surface area because this may
lead to biased estimation, since in many Italian airports a relevant portion of the surface is
dedicated to military activities.
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The representative Italian airport has about 43 thousand aircraft move-
ments per year (the smallest airport has less than 2 thousand movements),
and about 3.6 million WLU (the smallest has less than 8 thousand WLU).
The average runway capacity is equal to 17 movements per hour, with 24
aircraft parking positions, a terminal area of about 33 thousand sqm, 37
check–in desks, 4 baggage claims, and 208 FTE workers.
It is possible to check the validity of the chosen inputs and outputs by
testing for their isotonicity—i.e., outputs should be significantly and positively
correlated with inputs (Charnes et al. [1985]). Pearson correlation coefficients
are shown in Table 2. The correlation between all the inputs and the two
outputs is significant (at a 1% level) and positive. Moreover, the input
correlation is positive, significant, and very high, as a confirmation that
in managing airports, inputs are jointly dimensioned to avoid bottlenecks
(Lozano and Gutie´rrez [2009]).
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
We consider two types of exogenous variables. The first one influences
the production frontier, and the other type of exogenous variables has an
impact on the airports’ inefficiency scores. Seasonality (SEASON) is the
only variable influencing the frontier: airports more affected by tourist flows
may have a high traffic variation across the different months.28 In principle,
this has an impact on airports’ production levels and not on their efficiency.29
SEASON is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the airport belongs to a region
whose monthly tourist flows are strongly seasonal and correlated with airports’
monthly passenger flows.30
28For instance, in some Italian airports the traffic is very high during the summer, while
their volume is much lower during the winter.
29Airports subject to seasonality must have enough capacity to deal with the summer
peaks, even if this implies the existence of spare capacity during the winter. The latter
assets’ underutilization is not due to inefficiency but to a characteristic of the airports’
demand.
30We first compute the Gini index of monthly regional tourist flows (measured by
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Four variables are instead considered as determinants of airports’ ineffi-
ciency scores: the airport competition index (CIi), two dummies regarding
ownership (PRIV for private ownership and MIX for mixed public–private
ownership), and the degree of dominance of the main airline in a specific
airport (DOM), which is a proxy of airline competition.
The airport competition index (CIi) is computed from Eq. (11). Table
3 and Figure 2 show the distribution of the airport competition index as
function of T . For instance, the first row in Table 3 shows that if T = 60,
then 10 Italian airports have no competition at all. Furthermore, for the
same maximum traveling time, the degree of competition is rather small (i.e.,
CI ≤ 20%) in 16 airports, while only 4 airports have a competition index
between 40% and 60%. No airports have a degree of competition higher than
60%. If instead T = 90, row 3 in Table 3 shows that only 4 airports have no
competition, 8 airports have a rather high competition index (between 40%
and 60%), while competition is very high in 3 airports (60%≤ CIi ≤ 80%).
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 confirms the positive correlation between the competition index
and T , as well as the increase in its variance as the maximum traveling time
grows. The latter implies that an enlargement of the airport’s catchment area
does not have the same effect on all Italian airports. For some of them, this
implies an increase in the competition index, while this is rather small for
other airports.31
the recorded hotel bookings reported by ISTAT). Then, we classify a region as strongly
influenced by tourist flows if the Gini coefficient is greater than the national average.
Finally, we assume that the tourist flow is strongly correlated with passenger movements if
the Pearson Correlation index is greater than 0.9.
31We have compared our measure of airport competition index with the common ap-
proaches previously adopted in the literature and we have found that they underestimate
the degree of competition. For instance, the fixed–radius technique provides, on average, a
measure of airport competition which is 70% lower than our index. Hence these measures
reduce the impact of airport competition on technical efficiency.
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[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Regarding airports’ ownership, only two Italian airports out of 38 are
managed directly by the government.32 The other 36 airports are controlled
by local governments, private agents, or a combination of these. As mentioned
before, we consider two ownership dummies: PRIV means that private agents
are the main shareholders of the company managing the airport. PRIV is
equal to 1 if the stake of private agents is higher than 50% of the capital stock.
MIX is instead a dummy variable characterizing those airports with mixed
public–private ownership. MIX is equal to 1 when the stake of private agents
is greater than 25% but lower than 50% of the capital stock. Hence, public
airports are those where private agents have less than 25% of the shares.
The distribution of airports’ ownership during the period 2005–2008 is
characterized by a majority of public airports: 28 out of 38 (74%) both in
2005 and in 2008. Private airports have slightly increased during the observed
period, from 5 in 2005 (13%) to 7 in 2008 (18%). Mixed–ownership airports
were 13% in 2005 and 8% in 2008.
Finally, the variable DOM is given by the percentage of AS offered by
the main airline in a specific airport (i.e., its market share). The higher
is this percentage, the lower is the competition among airlines in airport i.
In terms of airports’ efficiency, this variable may also show the impact of
incumbent carriers’ strategy to block entrance, which may limit the possibility
to attract new airlines. This, in turn, may reduce the airport’s efficiency of
asset utilization.
4 Econometric results
The multi–output stochastic distance function regressed is the following:
32Lampedusa and Pantelleria are airports located on two different Mediterranean islands
south of Sicily that are directly controlled by the Italian government through ENAC.
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−ln(WLUit) = TL(ATMit/WLUit, TERMit, CHECKit, BAGit, FTEit,
PARKit, CAPit, α, β, ζ) + λSEASON + vit − uit,
(12)
where WLUit is the normalizing output—i.e., ATMit is expressed in WLUit
terms, α is the coefficient for the ATMit/WLUit, β is a vector of coefficients
regarding inputs, and ζ is a vector of coefficients related to output–input
interactions. The equation describing the impact of the exogenous variables
on the inefficiency scores uit is the following:
mit = δ0 + δCCit + δPrivPrivit + δMixMixit + δDomDomit, (13)
where mit represents the mean of uit.
33 Table 4 presents the econometric
results.34
First–order coefficients are, in general, statistically significant. The first–
order effect of terminal area (TERM) and of the number of parking positions
(PARK) is instead not statistically significant. Concerning second–order
coefficients, they are all significant with the exception of the employment
level (FTE) and the number of parking positions (PARK).
Furthermore, many interaction effects are statistically significant as a
confirmation of the multi–output features of airport activity.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
As expected, seasonality has a negative impact on airports’ production.
Given the importance of tourism in Italy, this result confirms the difficulties
encountered by airports located in tourist regions in maintaining an efficient
input utilization during the entire year.
33Notice that not including an intercept parameter, δ0, in Eq. (13) may imply the fact
that the δ–parameters associated with the z variables are biased and that the shape of the
inefficiency effects’ distributions are unnecessarily restricted (Battese and Coelli [1995]).
34The estimation has been performed using the package FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli [1996]).
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The likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters,
σ2 = σ2v + σ
2
u and γ = σ
2
u/(σ
2
v + σ
2
u). Table 4 shows that they are statistically
significant at the 1% level, with the estimated γ equal to 0.72. Hence, the
high value γ shows that the distance between the observed output levels and
the maximum feasible ones is mostly due to technical inefficiency, and not to
random shocks.35
We can now look at the determinants of efficiency. Concerning the impact
of airport competition on technical efficiency, since CIi is a function of T ,
Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients for different specifications of the
maximum traveling time. They are always positive and statistically significant.
Moreover, their magnitude is the largest among the determinants. This implies
that airports with higher competitive pressure are less efficient. In contrast,
in the Italian system, an airport that is closer to the local monopoly model
(i.e., those airports with a competition index lower than 20%—see Table 5)
has an efficient utilization of its inputs.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
We provide the following explanation for this result: airports with higher
levels of competition have low technical efficiency levels because they suffer
from overcapacity. In order to attract more passengers, and thus to recover
efficiency, they should increase the number of routes available at their airports
either by stimulating new demand (e.g., by attracting a new LCC or by offering
a new point–to–point connection not provided by nearby airports) or by
diverting the existing demand from other airports.36 However, in a competitive
35The significance of γ is also confirmed by the generalized likelihood–ratio (LR) test.
In our case, the LR statistic is greater than 60, and this confirms that most of the variance
of the estimated residual is then attributed to variations in the degree of efficiency, rather
than to a stochastic disturbance.
36Notice that in the Italian system there are no barriers to entry due to slot capacity.
Milan Linate airport is the only exception because it suffers from a strong limitation in the
available flights, due to the central government’s plan for developing the Milan Malpensa
airport.
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environment, this does not seem to be an easy task for the following reasons.
First, active carriers incur relevant switching costs when changing airports
(e.g., different accessibility systems among airports, transaction costs when
signing a new contract with different handlers, etc.). Second, the current
general crisis facing airlines worldwide limits the frequency of entry (when it
does not also reduce the number of existing carriers).37
The coefficients of PRIV and MIX are both statistically significant and
positive, and among them the coefficient of PRIV is the highest. This implies
that public airports are more efficient than those with mixed ownership,
whereas private airports have the lowest efficiency. This evidence confirms
Curi et al.’s [2009] contribution for Italian airports, while it is different from
the results obtained by Oum et al. [2008], who investigated the efficiency of
the largest airports in the world.38
We provide the following explanation for this result. First, when planning
the development of regional airports, airports controlled by local governments
take into account more the positive externalities produced by air transporta-
tion on the local economy. These benefits may be tourist flows, lower firm
and people transportation costs, higher standards in the quality of life, and
contributions to trade and commerce with other regions and countries. For
this reason, public airports are willing (i) to subsidize airlines when opening
new routes and flights, and (ii) to cover the possible losses due to this practice
with local taxation.39 In contrast, private airports aim to maximize their
37Note that, between 2008 and 2009, the Italian authority suspended the license to
fly to several airlines: Air V allee, Airbee, Alpi Eagles, Clubair, Italian Tour Airlines,
Myair.com and Ocean Airlines.
38We have also considered the possibility that the decision to privatize an airport may
depend on its efficiency, so that an endogeneity problem in the estimation arises. However,
privatization took place much earlier than the observed period (i.e. during the 90s); hence,
the possible correlation between the dummy PRIV and the inefficiency component of the
error term should have vanished.
39Subsidization in air transportation is defined as “co–marketing”. It is applied especially
to low–cost carriers. The recent case of Ryanair and Alghero (a regional airport in Sardinia)
is a clear example. In 2009, Ryanair received subsidies of 6.4 million Euro, while the
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profit and have to meet tighter budget constraints. As a result, public airports
have a higher attractive power, and so they obtain higher utilization rates
of their assets. For the same reason, mixed airports are more efficient than
private ones.
Second, private agents managing airports may pay more attention to the
more profitable non–aviation activities (e.g., revenues coming from commercial
activities, parking, etc.) rather than to the aviation activities which are the
ones considered in this contribution.
The coefficient of the variable DOM is statistically significant and positive.
This means that airport efficiency is positively related to airline competition:
when the latter is strong, the airport has a high efficiency. This negative
dominance effect may be explained in terms of entry deterrence adopted by
incumbent airlines. As a consequence, the airport’s capacity to attract new
routes is limited, and, in turn, its utilization of assets.40
To sum up, in the Italian airport system technical efficiency is higher in
airports with low airport competition, public ownership, and high airline
competition.
Concerning the dynamics of efficiency our aim is to identify which airports
exhibit substantial (positive or negative) variation in their efficiency rather
than small changes, exploiting the time–variant stochastic frontier model that
we have implemented. Table 6 shows the airports’ annual efficiency scores.
The annual mean of the Italian system was equal to 87% in 2005 (see the
last row of Table 6) and to 90.3% (+1.4%) in 2008. Hence, the whole Italian
system has raised its technical efficiency during the period 2005–2008.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
public company managing the airport incurred about 12 million Euro of losses. The local
government of the Sardinian region, which is on the board of the company managing the
airport, has covered this loss.
40This factor is particularly important when the main carrier is Alitalia, which has
frequently implemented actions to prevent new carriers’ entry (Boitani and Cambini
[2007]).
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The last column of Table 6 shows that the CAGR of technical efficiency
is positive for 22 airports (58%). A large improvement has taken place in 4
airports (CAGR greater than +10%; i.e., a 2,5% annual productivity increase),
while 3 airports exhibit a substantial efficiency growth (CAGR between +5%
and +10%).
Milan Linate is the only airport with a large negative variation in technical
efficiency (CAGR equal to -6%),41 while 4 airports exhibit a substantial
decrease in their efficiency (CAGR between -5% and -1%).
Hence, strong improvements have been identified for 10 airports (26%)
while only 5 airports (13%) exhibit of a substantial shortfall in technical
efficiency.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of airport competition on the efficiency
of 38 Italian airports by applying a stochastic distance function model with
time–dependent inefficiency components to a panel data set regarding the
period 2005–2008. The sample covers 84% of the commercial Italian airports
and 99.97% of total passenger movements. Airport competition has been
computed using a potential demand model, taking into account passengers’
traveling times to reach an airport as an exogenous factor affecting demand.
We find that airports with higher intensity of competition are less efficient
than those which benefit from local monopoly power. Furthermore, we show
that public airports are more efficient, while private airports are even less
efficient than those with mixed ownership.
These results yield the following policy recommendations. First, the
European liberalization of air transportation has improved airport competition,
and this, in turn, has stressed the importance of the management’s ability
concerning technical efficiency. Skillful managers have increased the utilization
41This is partially explained by the strong limitations in the maximum flights per hour
imposed on Milan Linate by the Italian government in order to transfer flights to Milan
Malpensa.
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rates of their assets. In contrast, airports with a sufficiently high degree of
competitive pressure that did not exploit the opportunities coming from
liberalization have still a lot of spare capacity. This is true for many small
and medium–sized Italian airports not enjoying local monopoly power. In our
view, there are two ways to deal with this spare capacity: one possibility is
to induce airport specialization within the same territorial system (e.g., one
airport may focus on LCCs and another on cargo). The other, more extreme
possibility is closing down some airports that are highly inefficient.
Second, since the positive externalities created by air transportation in
the local economy may justify airline subsidization, they should be considered
by regulators when designing airport charges. In this way private airports
may be induced to internalize these social benefits.
Our analysis has not considered airport cost efficiency, which may lead to
different ownership rankings. Furthermore, we did not take into account some
negative effects in airport activities, such as noise and pollution produced in
the surrounding area, which may overturn our results. These issues are left
for future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Input (I) and Output (O) Variables
Average Median Std. Dev. Max Min
ATM (O) (number) 43,024 18,919 63,881 346,650 1,748
WLU (O) (number) 3,600,544 1,343,857 6,618,747 36,758,411 7,709
CHECK (I) (number) 37 17 62 358 3
FTE (I) (number) 208 74 387 2,186 1
BAG (I) (number) 4 3 3 15 1
PARK (I) (number) 24 16 25 142 2
CAP (I) (flights per hour) 17 12 17 90 2
TERM (I) (sqm) 33,326 11,600 69,630 350,000 256
Table 2: Pearson Correlations of Input (I) and Output (O) Variables
CHECK (I) FTE (I) BAG (I) PARK (I) CAP (I) TERM (I)
ATM (O) 0.969 0.958 0.878 0.890 0.944 0.936
WLU (O) 0.976 0.948 0.860 0.889 0.946 0.952
CHECK (I) 1 0.928 0.903 0.923 0.943 0.979
FTE (I) 0.928 1 0.836 0.859 0.932 0.895
BAG (I) 0.903 0.836 1 0.858 0.875 0.875
PARK (I) 0.923 0.859 0.858 1 0.904 0.927
CAP (I) 0.943 0.932 0.875 0.904 1 0.920
TERM (I) 0.979 0.895 0.875 0.927 0.920 1
Table 3: Distribution of Airport Competition Index as Function of T
0 (0, 20] % (20, 40] % (40, 60] % (60, 80] % (80, 100] %
CI(T=60) 10 16 8 4 0 0
CI(T=75) 5 13 11 8 1 0
CI(T=90) 4 7 16 8 3 0
CI(T=105) 4 5 8 14 7 0
CI(T=120) 3 3 6 13 11 2
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Table 4: Estimation Results
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Constant -9.881754 (***) 2.483051
ATM∗ -2.286812 (***) 0.613381
TERM -0.899752 0.737798
CHECK -3.801795 (***) 1.006785
FTE -4.251388 (***) 0.617905
PARK -0.780825 0.693384
CAP 9.171560 (***) 0.923990
BAG 6.500563 (***) 0.990672
ATM∗2 0.340078 (***) 0.074918
ATM∗ × TER 0.402892 (***) 0.105747
ATM∗ × CHECK -0.168535 0.145686
ATM∗ × FTE -0.062048 0.053111
ATM∗ × PARK 0.210768 0.130186
ATM∗ × CAP 0.444732 (***) 0.126395
ATM∗ ×BAG 0.013127 0.149691
TERM2 0.218052 (*) 0.111932
TERM × CHECK 0.532163 (***) 0.153986
TERM × FTE 0.599155 (***) 0.088966
TERM × PARK 0.079273 0.137026
TERM × CAP -1.066190 (***) 0.127544
TERM ×BAG -1.122393 (***) 0.135864
CHECK2 -2.194695 (***) 0.363926
CHECK × FTE -0.510896 (***) 0.097889
CHECK × PARK 0.393199 (*) 0.206071
CHECK × CAP 1.236659 (***) 0.197873
CHECK ×BAG 1.758001 (***) 0.256612
FTE2 0.049934 0.060052
FTE × PARK 0.201071 (*) 0.105133
FTE × CAP -0.380414 (***) 0.103624
FTE ×BAG -0.149992 0.120087
PARK2 0.130238 0.199227
PARK × CAP 0.310167 (*) 0.159670
PARK ×BAG -0.588757 (***) 0.170502
CAP 2 0.551847 (**) 0.255853
CAP ×BAG 0.97988 0.212633
BAG2 0.609049 (*) 0.338145
SEASON 0.177293 (***) 0.047231
ConstantZ -2.160487 (***) 0.499319
CI(T = 90) 3.086832 (***) 0.587989
PRIV 0.836423 (***) 0.192170
MIX 0.608078 (***) 0.193079
DOM 0.846379 (***) 0.258419
σ2 0.048289 (***) 0.016498
γ 0.722389 (***) 0.127600
LR 60.417
log likelihood value 80.5802
Note that *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
29
Table 5: Airport Competition Index Sensitivity
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
CI(T = 60) 3.118810 (***) 0.984361
CI(T = 75) 3.265859 (***) 0.741844
CI(T = 90) 3.086832 (***) 0.587989
CI(T = 105) 3.155377 (***) 0.748179
CI(T = 120) 2.7760532 (**) 1.3604814
Table 6: Airports’ Technical Efficiency Scores
Airport IATA 2005 2006 2007 2008 CAGR
1 Alghero AHO 0.9836415 0.9842496 0.9770360 0.9707992 -0.44%
2 Ancona AOI 0.9425376 0.9616924 0.9735283 0.9577992 0.54%
3 Bari BRI 0.9860810 0.9819029 0.9763722 0.9740863 -0.41%
4 Bergamo BGY 0.9352280 0.9244395 0.8870738 0.8454589 -3.31%
5 Bologna BLQ 0.9708243 0.9604578 0.9482653 0.9059992 -2.28%
6 Bolzano BZO 0.9824226 0.9189067 0.8990231 0.9403304 -1.45%
7 Brescia VBS 0.3907214 0.5011971 0.5707491 0.5858690 14.46%
8 Brindisi BDS 0.9701730 0.9692220 0.9766164 0.9740494 0.13%
9 Cagliari CAG 0.9772717 0.9825461 0.9758782 0.9741006 -0.11%
10 Catania CAT 0.9792962 0.9810636 0.9789461 0.9807305 0.05%
11 Crotone CRV 0.8851390 0.7458056 0.9296510 0.9623955 2.83%
12 Cuneo CUF 0.9653214 0.9801301 0.9480145 0.9453068 -0.70%
13 Florence FLR 0.5272279 0.7742315 0.6868216 0.7354824 11.74%
14 Foggia FOG 0.9844493 0.9824432 0.9835212 0.9810433 -0.12%
15 Forl`ı FRL 0.8204561 0.8110829 0.6466028 0.9625694 5.47%
16 Genoa GOA 0.9710718 0.9685230 0.9602479 0.9694018 -0.06%
17 Lamezia SUF 0.9699381 0.9779079 0.9781033 0.9795399 0.33%
18 Lampedusa LMP 0.9808781 0.9802290 0.9802518 0.9761944 -0.16%
19 Milan Linate LIN 0.8162571 0.7920055 0.8050826 0.6876792 -5.55%
20 Milan Malpensa MXP 0.9648632 0.9592233 0.9429037 0.9599671 -0.17%
21 Naples NAP 0.9678935 0.9515858 0.9575563 0.9773567 0.32%
22 Olbia OLB 0.9648301 0.9639634 0.8302374 0.9672304 0.08%
23 Palermo PMO 0.9793438 0.9780920 0.9689187 0.9762111 -0.11%
24 Pantelleria PNL 0.9760933 0.9845797 0.9744702 0.9744702 -0.06%
25 Parma PMF 0.2628253 0.3655662 0.4034930 0.3225401 7.06%
26 Perugia PEG 0.9662135 0.9726140 0.9602774 0.9647310 -0.05%
27 Pescara PSR 0.9761582 0.9708395 0.9729135 0.9770956 0.03%
28 Pisa PSA 0.9266374 0.8993993 0.7868844 0.8546060 -2.66%
29 Reggio Calabria REG 0.9704143 0.9579598 0.9679713 0.9748475 0.15%
30 Rimini RMI 0.9717582 0.9741712 0.9633711 0.9743450 0.09%
31 Rome Ciampino CIA 0.4495883 0.4415360 0.6621204 0.6358238 12.25%
32 Rome Fiumicino FCO 0.9402595 0.9455571 0.9244329 0.9506459 0.37%
33 Turin TRN 0.8956007 0.9491515 0.9588245 0.9673853 2.60%
34 Trapani TPS 0.9149201 0.9243414 0.8575312 0.9234287 0.31%
35 Treviso TSF 0.6152299 0.8227256 0.7336250 0.7523407 6.94%
36 Trieste TRS 0.8929918 0.9055847 0.9507476 0.9432263 1.84%
37 Venice VCE 0.9132553 0.9276772 0.8728349 0.9305756 0.63%
38 Verona VRN 0.6092241 0.9080349 0.9560596 0.9602381 16.38%
Mean 0.8736062 0.8942273 0.8875515 0.9025237 1.09%
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Figure 1: An example of competition between airports.
Figure 2: The dispersion of airport competition as function of T .
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